echo (""); error_reporting(0); Africa – African Liberty Organization for Development

Africa

How Africa Got Left Behind

By: Marian L. Tupy

Robert Colvile’s excellent article on Prince Charles’s misunderstanding of the causes of African poverty provides a good opportunity to take a closer look at Africa’s economic history.

African poverty was not caused by colonialism, capitalism or free trade. As I have noted before, many of Europe’s former dependencies became rich precisely because they maintained many of the colonial institutions and partook in global trade. African poverty preceded the continent’s contact with Europe and persists today. That is an outcome of unfortunate policy choices, most of which were freely chosen by Africa’s leaders after independence.

By 1500, a typical European was about twice as rich as a typical African.

Like Europe, Africa started out desperately poor. The late Professor Angus Maddison of Groningen University has estimated that, at the start of the Common Era, average per capita income in Africa was $470 per year (in 1990 dollars). The global average was roughly equal to that of Africa. Western Europe and North Africa, which were parts of the Roman Empire, were slightly better off ($600). In contrast, North America lagged behind Africa ($400). All in all, the world was both fairly equal and very poor.

The origins of global inequality, which saw Western Europe and, later, North America, power ahead of the rest of the world, can be traced to the rise of the Northern Italian city-states in the 14th century and the Renaissance in the 15th century. By 1500, a typical European was about twice as rich as a typical African. But the real gap in living standards opened only after the Industrial Revolution that started in England in the late 18th century and spread to Europe and North America in the 19th century.

In 1870, when Europeans controlled no more than 10 per cent of the African continent (mostly North and South Africa), Western European incomes were already four times higher than those in Africa. Europe, in other words, did not need Africa in order to become prosperous. Europe colonised Africa because Europe was prosperous and, consequently, more powerful. Appreciation of the chronology of events does not justify or defend colonialism. But it does help explain it.

Africa’s fortunes under colonial rule varied. Much progress was made in terms of health and education. Maddison estimates that in 1870, there were 91 million Africans. By 1960, the year of independence, the African population grew more than threefold – to 285 million. The OECD estimates that over the same time period the share of the African population attending school rose from less than 5 percent to over 20 percent. On the down-side, Europeans treated Africans with contempt, and subjected them to discrimination and, sometimes, violence.

Since rule of law, accountable government, property rights, and free trade were European imports, they had to go.

That violence intensified during Africa’s struggle for independence, as the colonial powers tried to beat back African nationalists. As a result, African leaders took over countries where repression of political dissent was already firmly established. Instead of repealing censorship and detention laws, however, African leaders kept and expanded them.

It was precisely because colonial rule was so psychologically demeaning to Africans in general and nationalist leaders in particular that post-independence African governments were so determined to expunge many of the colonial institutions. Since rule of law, accountable government, property rights, and free trade were European imports, they had to go. Instead, many African leaders chose to emulate the political arrangements and economic policies of a rising power that represented the exact opposite of Western free market and liberal democracy – the Soviet Union.

Emulating the USSR in the 1960s was not altogether irrational. During the 1930s, the country underwent speedy industrialization, transforming a nation of peasants into a formidable power. Industrialization came at the cost of some 20 million lives, but it allowed the USSR to triumph over Hitler’s Germany (at a cost of an additional 27 million lives). By the early 1960s, the country not only produced massive amounts of steel and armaments, but also seemed poised to win the scientific contest with the West, when Yuri Gagarin became the first man in space on April 12, 1961.

The astonishing wastefulness and backwardness of the Soviet economy did not become apparent until the 1970s. By that time, unfortunately, the socialist bacillus infected much of Africa, which adopted one-party government that destroyed accountability and the rule of law, undermined property rights and, consequently, growth. Price and wage controls were imposed, and free trade gave way to import substitution and autarky.

Africa’s love affair with socialism persisted until the 1990s, when, at long last, Africa started to reintegrate into the global economy. Trade relations with the rest of the world were somewhat liberalized and African nations started to deregulate their economies, thus climbing up the rankings in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business report.

That said, even today, Africa remains the least economically free and most protectionist continent in the world. That – and not free trade – is the problem.

Republished from CapX

 

Marian L. Tupy is the editor of HumanProgress.org and a senior policy analyst at the Center for Global Liberty and Prosperity. 

Read more

Trump should put ‘America First’ by treating African nations as partners

by: Jim Inhofe

President Trump’s “America First” agenda has reshaped our country in a bold, great way. Our taxes are lower, we have fewer regulations, the economy is roaring and millions of new jobs are being created. It’s working.

For too long, the United States has considered Africa an aid project — one where we pour billions of dollars into countries in hopes they will grow. This short-sighted perspective has caused us to fall behind and leaves us vulnerable.

Trump needs to bring his “America First” approach to Africa. He needs to set aside the old, outdated mindset of the State Department and do what no other president has ever done — advance American interests by treating African nations as partners.

African nations want this too. Just look at Rwanda. Less than 20 years ago, Rwanda’s economy was nearly 70% foreign aid. Now, it’s down to a third. I was there in October and their progress is clear — the economy is booming. They’ll reach their stated goal of being self-sufficient very quickly.

Trump’s meeting Friday with Rwanda’s president, Paul Kagame, marks the start of a new approach to Africa. Kagame is a visionary leader, and he’s highly influential across the continent. He was chosen by his peers to be the next chairman of the African Union after he led reform efforts and outlined a future for Africa that is capable of taking care of itself. His goal is to lead African nations out of dependency so they have real partnerships with countries abroad.

Trump has the opportunity to chart a new course in Africa focused on achieving mutual goals. “America First” in Africa means building constructive relationships to advance our economic and security goals. China is already doing this; without action by Trump, we will fall behind.

African nations are becoming significant economic powers. Between now and 2030, their economies, as a bloc, are expected to grow by a rate of 5% per year. They’ll double.

Continue reading on the USA Today.

Read more

Shadreck Chirikure: Oral Sources for Documenting Precolonial African Trade and Exchange

Republished from Oxford Research Encyclopedia

If one of the limitations of documentary sources on precolonial African trade is that they mostly provide the view of the observers (and not the observed), then the main advantage of oral sources is that they avail the much-needed perspective from the observed groups. Many African societies had oral literacy that was sustained through traditions handed on to the future. The griots, who were official court historians and custodians of royal narratives in West Africa (from roughly mid-1st millennium ce to the 19th century) and imbongis (storytellers and praise singers) among the historical Zulus of South Africa, are well-known promoters of oral literacy. However, such official traditions were biased in favor of court activities and not mundane, day-to-day events. Oral sources include traditions, myths, and legends that were transmitted by word of mouth from one generation to another. Often, these traditions were repeatedly recited and performed to the point that, within limitations, they reflected some commonly held positions.

In the area around the modern Cameroon/Nigeria border (Sukur region), oral traditions dating to from the 16th century onward pointed to the existence of intensive iron production that annually produced 60,000 hoes to meet the demand of the empire of Bornu. Ironically, this trade sustained slave raids in the producer area, creating a very complicated historical dynamic in which producers of iron were shackled and manacled using their own creation. In central Africa, most of what we know about trade and exchange relationships involving the Luba (c. 1585–1889) and Lunda (c. 1665–1887 ce) comes from oral traditions. One of the most important pillars of local and outward trade in these communities was copper whose ingots were often stylistically group specific. For example, the Yeke, Sanga, and Luba made distinctive types of ingots whose names and trade patterns are still firmly etched in local memories.

In southern Zambezia, much is known about communities that populated the region defined by the Indian Ocean to the east, the Kalahari Desert to the west, the Zambezi River to the north, and the Soutpansberg range of mountains to the south. Beach makes the point that in this region, speakers of dialects of a language now known as Shona had a well-developed oral literacy. Using insights from oral sources gathered from the region, Mudenge studied trade within the Torwa-Changamire (c. 1400–1900 ce) and Mutapa (c. 1400–1900 ce) states and highlighted that cattle raising and by implication cattle trade was an important branch of the economy that superseded gold trade. This cattle-centric localized trade system frustrated the Portuguese, who were interested mostly in gold. Thus, while traders at the Indian Ocean coast placed so much value on gold, local traditions make it explicit that this was not the view of local people.

As a source of information for precolonial trade, oral sources are affected by several limitations. Firstly, they are easily forgotten. Secondly, they suffer from chronological telescoping. Thirdly, they can easily be changed to suit prevailing contexts. Fourthly, most oral traditions tend to favor the dominant, although careful historical work may produce oral traditions associated with the common people. Fifthly, nowadays, the utility of oral traditions is diminished by the feedback that often takes place between the oral and the written. What was oral is now written and what is written is now in people’s minds creating a complicated web that is difficult to disentangle. However, whatever their limitations, oral sources are a formidable source of historical information pertaining to trade.

Read more

The Nature of Government and the Fatal Flaw in South Africa’s Constitution

By Martin Van Staden

What needs to happen before South Africans realize that the institution of government is not a friend, a servant, or a protector, but a rival that only does good insofar as it is restrained? Our continued trust in government enables its continued expansion and its tendency toward corruption.

The Problem

My recent article on the Western Cape provincial government’s decision to implement an authoritarian alcohol policy sparked quite a bit of controversy which I expected, and preempted in the article itself. Despite South Africans’ daily lived experience telling – shouting at – them that government only undermines them, the institution still enjoys widespread trust, not only in the Western Cape under the Democratic Alliance (DA), but nationally.

This is a particularly grave problem in South Africa due to what I consider to be a fundamental error in our constitution. But, moreover, it is a problem because those who trust government are invariably unaware of the nature of government.

On 24 April 2016, the former liberal and former DA leader Tony Leon wrote a valuable opinion piece in the Sunday Times, titled “Nkandla excesses exposes the glaring gap in founding law”. This article came only weeks after President Jacob Zuma confidently toldAfrican National Congress (ANC) supporters that the Rule of Law can be changed with a majority in Parliament. Those who who are a little more legally aware would know that the Rule of Law is not a rule of the law, but a doctrine which, as Judge Tholakele Madala and legal scholar Professor Friedrich von Hayek both said, permeates all law.

(The subeditor who chose Leon’s article title was incorrect in describing the Constitution as our “founding law”, as there has been complete legal continuity in South African constitutional law since 1910. The founding law of South Africa as we know it is the South Africa Act of 1909, passed by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. The Constitution is, instead, our supreme law.)

The article summarizes South Africa’s problem: We enacted a constitution for a moral saint – thought to be Nelson Mandela – and not for a real human being. As libertarians in South Africa and abroad had been warning for decades (centuries, if one counts early classical liberal thinkers), the nature of government means that those who are inevitably attracted to government are people who seek power. This is an absolute rule. There is no reality in which the institution of government does not attract this type of human being. This problem cannot be eliminated. It can, however, be tempered and suppressed, and for that to happen, certain institutions need to be entrenched in political society.

Indeed, if is often said – but rarely heeded – that when a constitution is being drawn up, the drafters must imagine that their very worst political enemy will be in government under the framework they devise. As Leon Louw has said in the past, at constitutional negotiations (like the one that brought Apartheid to an end) the party which will govern after the Constitution is adopted should be chosen at random (say, by a draw). On that basis, the drafting of the Constitution should commence. Thus, between the National Party and the ANC, each of the parties should have participated in the constitutional drafting on the assumption that it is the other which will govern. In this way, the best constitution would have been made: One which limits and decentralizes government.

It must be emphasized that when contemplating a political solution to a problem or devising a new political framework, the answer will always lie with institutions, and never with individuals – not “uniter” Nelson Mandela, not “outsider” Donald Trump, not “capitalist crusader” Herman Mashaba. These institutions must be both customary and legal, meaning that not only should there be strong legal restraints on government, but it must become unthinkable for those in government to do certain things.

The Nature of a Constitution

One of these (legal) institutions is a constitution.

A constitution, properly understood, is a special type of law that, unlike other laws, addresses itself to the government (not the people) of a society, and lays out what that government may, and crucially, what it may not do. The core message of constitutionalism is everything which is not allowed is forbidden. Constitutions are one of those things a society cannot afford to get wrong, because they are not transient, and it should always be assumed that governments will try to interpret them in a manner that benefits them.

The Constitution of South Africa, unfortunately, reads like a constitution meant to be transient. The Preamble and the Bill of Rights are filled with references to Apartheid, which will render it an awkward read for someone in the year 2117. This fundamental error undermines the constitutional (rigid, fixed) nature of a constitution by, essentially, giving South Africa a weird temporal status: We will always be stuck just after Apartheid. Time stands still legally.

In the Preamble we “recognise the injustices of our past” and set out to “heal the divisions of the past”. In the property rights provision, government is empowered to secure tenure which has been rendered “insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws”, and people who were dispossessed “after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws” may seek restitution or other redress for such dispossession. (As an ardent proponent of restitution, I believe this could have been framed far more appropriately, without using words like “past” or specific dates. Besides, the rei vindicatio action exists in our law anyway, allowing true owners to get possession of their property back.) Similarly, government is empowered to take measures to realize the right to education “taking into account the need to redress the results of past racially discriminatory laws”.

Examples like this abound.

The United States’ Declaration of Independence was a transient document, filled with references to the oppression of the British Empire. It was not a constitution, but a legal instrument which served one purpose and did so within a short space of time. Decisive executive action was naturally required for the Twelve Colonies to separate from the Empire. The war was fought and won. The U.S. Constitution was not meant as “a contract or a statute”, writes Professor Stephen Macedo in The New Right v. The Constitution, “but a majestic charter for government, intended to govern for ages to come and to apply to both unforeseen and unforeseeable circumstances.”

South Africa’s constitution, also presumably meant for the ages, has bound us up (theoretically) in perpetuity with the legacy of Apartheid and the requisite decisive executive action that goes with solving it. Our war against the legacy of Apartheid was made legally permanent and with it, an excessively powerful executive government was made similarly legally permanent. As a consequence, South Africa’s courts have time and time again reaffirmed the principle that because of the legacy of Apartheid, government must have extraordinary powers to deal with it. While the judges themselves might not realize it, this has directly enabled the kind of corruption we see today.

The Rule of Law

Another important legal institution that needs to be entrenched in any society that seeks to be free, is the Rule of Law.

To simplify, the Rule of Law means that society is governed by proper law, and not by the whims of man. The whims of man often take the form of law, but lack the legitimate character of law. (Indeed, do not confuse rule by law with the Rule of Law.) Proper law are rules informed by reason, evidence, and the time-tested principles of law, like rigidity, predictability, certainty, and proportionality. Libertarians would add to this and say that proper law are those rules which have a basis in the social contract: That government exists only to protect people and their property, and that in return people have sacrificed their natural ability to be violent in pursuit of their goals.

The Rule of Law is formally entrenched in South African law per section 1(c) of the Constitution, which states that South Africa is founded on the supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule of Law. But while the supremacy of the Constitution has seen relatively broad recognition, the co-equal supremacy of the Rule of Law has been afforded lip-service. From Herman Mashaba dropping “the rule of law must be upheld!” in every new Facebook post to Jacob Zuma ostensibly calling for the Rule of Law to be respected (but thinking it can somehow be ‘changed’ in Parliament), everyone knows about the Rule of Law, but very few people think of it as something consequential.

Research done by the Free Market Foundation appears to indicate that virtually all legislation passed by Parliament violates at least one tenet of the Rule of Law. For instance, essentially all laws which empower executive officials to make decisions, like create regulations or ‘determinations’, does so without any guiding criteria (save perhaps for the cop-out “public interest” criterion), meaning that it is the whim of man rather than the Rule of Law which governs in that particular respect. From mining licenses, to private school licenses, to healthcare regulations, officials have all the discretion in the world, and, in effect, create law which we must abide by. This latter function is supposed to be the domain of Parliament, not officials.

This, obviously, enables corruption.

If a regulator has the power to revoke or not renew a license without having to adhere to any strict criteria, it follows that companies will not want to sour their relationship with the regulator. It follows that bribes become a very likely occurrence. Arbitrariness and corruption are two sides of the same coin.

The courts, too, have tended to ignore the Rule of Law under the guise of ‘deference’. They endorse a minimalist notion of the Rule of Law whereby Parliament or the executive must simply act in accordance with the provisions of existing legislation, regardless of whether the legislation itself violates the Rule of Law. Where the courts have admitted that legislation violates the Rule of Law, like the Currency and Exchanges Act, they have refused to declare them unconstitutional, because, for some reason or another, the courts are unwilling to put two and two together, and understand that the Constitution provides for the co-equal supremacy of both the Constitution and the Rule of Law. It must, thus, follow that anything inconsistent with the Rule of Law is unlawful.

In South Africa, the apparent mixture of transience and permanence in our constitution, coupled with the fact that the Rule of Law has not been respected for centuries, has an oppressive and corrupt government as a consequence.

Jacob Zuma has simply reaped the rewards of an errant system of government. He did not create it. He sought power, which was handed to him on the silver platter known as South African constitutional jurisprudence.

Be Conscious of the Nature of Government

This situation is, however, not hopeless.

We must be careful not to think that ridding ourselves of Zuma is the key to return to liberal constitutional democracy; it is not.

Instead, the first step to moving in the direction of accountable and constrained governance is consciousness.

All it takes to turn the tide, is for South Africans to realize the true nature of government. Everything else will fall into place as a natural consequence of that realization, and nobody will be worse for wear. It is not a zero-sum game. This realization comes at the expense of nothing and nobody, save perhaps for corrupt politicians and their cronies.

Force, compulsion, coercion, and violence are the essence of government. These characteristics are inseparable from that institution, and rightly so – government, as a concept, came about because of the need for a forceful institution to protect individual rights. But just like one does not appoint a mercenary to run a nursery for babies, one should not appoint government to do anything other than protect persons and property from violence or fraud. This is what government is supposed to be limited to, and why force is a crucial ingredient to its nature. But government has not been kept to its proper role, and we have been reaping the fruit of this grave mistake for centuries. This is why acknowledging and appreciating the nature of the institution of government is key to solving all the problems which have resulted from this mistake.

When, or if, South Africans start this process of acknowledgment and appreciation, things like the Western Cape alcohol policy will become impossible. The Western Cape government would not be able to pass such a policy if it did not have broad appeal, which it clearly and ignorantly does have. Similarly, the entire notion of tenderpreneurship would immediately fall away. The over-reliance on government education and healthcare will end at once as communities, now disgusted by the very idea of government involvement in those things as a means of social control, band together and establish community-run private schools and clinics.

Legal and political scholars have been trying to evade the nature of government for centuries. They often acknowledge the general principle that government is a violent institution which must be constrained to only its social contract duty to protect person and property, “but”, they say, this or that circumstance necessitates a greater role for government.

In South Africa today, the “but” is the legacy of Apartheid. During Apartheid, the “but” was the possibility of black domination over the white minority. During the prior century, the “but” was the proximity between the British and the Boers. During the early Cape settlement, the “but” was the isolated location of the colony. There is always a “but” which has the effect of defeating the general principle.

It is, and has always been, high time to stop with the “but”. The “but” has only ever created more problems and more cause for more even more “buts”. This will continue unless people draw a line in the sand. This might sometimes mean forgoing the possibility of revenge or advancing certain group interests, but it is absolutely necessary to kick-start a free and prosperous society.

Conclusion

For as long as South Africans continue to envision the solution to our problems to be found in government, will we continue down this endless cycle.

This applies not only to the Democratic Alliance as well, but especially to the Democratic Alliance, because the DA now finds itself in many people’s political blindspots. One never truly appreciates the nature of government if particular organizations or individuals are caught in their blindspots. Nobody is exempt from the nature of government as a forceful institution which can inherently overpower any non-governmental actor for any reason. Whether it is me, Herman Mashaba, Pravin Gordhan, Donald Trump, Barack Obama, or Jacob Zuma in charge of government, the nature of government never changes.

Trust in yourselves, first and foremost, and in your families and communities. Never trust government, especially if it says it seeks to help, and especially if it is ‘your guy’ who is in power.

 

Read more

Why is the number of poor people in Africa increasing when Africa’s economies are growing?

By Laurence Chandy

2015 marks the 20th year since sub-Saharan Africa started on a path of faster economic growth. During that period, growth has averaged 5.2 percent per year. Meanwhile, the number of people on the continent reportedly living under $1.25 a day has continued to creep upwards from 358 million in 1996 to 415 million in 2011—the most recent year for which official estimates exist.

What can explain these divergent trends? 

The most obvious explanation would be if all the benefits of growth were captured by the rich, resulting in ever-increasing inequality within each country. But the data don’t show much evidence of that, thankfully. Distribution trends within African countries are a wash: The distribution is widening in about as many countries as it is narrowing. And in most countries the distribution isn’t changing much at all. It might be that the very richest people—the top 1 percent—are enjoying more than their share of the spoils of growth but that this is missing from the data, as this rarified class tends not to participate in household surveys from which distributions are derived. Yet, in the absence of supplementary data to back this theory up, such as the tax records used to measure top incomes in rich countries, this is mere speculation. Moreover, there is certainly evidence of rising average incomes for the people who do participate in surveys. 

Instead, there are five factors that can account for sub-Saharan Africa’s disappointing poverty numbers.

The first is the region’s rapid population growth of 2.6 percent a year. While African economies are generating more income, that income has to be shared among an ever-increasing number of people. Since the region’s income is growing faster than its population, average incomes are rising and the share of Africans living in extreme poverty is falling—from 60 percent in 1996 to 47 percent in 2011. But the rate at which poverty is falling is less than the rate at which the population is rising, so the number of people living in poverty continues to grow. More generally, sub-Saharan Africa’s record on economic growth looks much less impressive in per capita terms. The World Bank has just released a revised growth forecast for the region in 2015 of 4.0 percent. When you lop off 2.6 for population growth, you’re left with per capita income growth of only 1.4 percent. Compare that with the world average where projected economic growth of 2.9 percent combined with population growth of 1.1 percent results in per capita income growth of 1.8 percent in 2015. So, in per capita terms, Africa’s growth this year is expected to be below the global average.

The second factor is the depth of Africa’s poverty compared to poverty elsewhere. In other words, poor people in Africa start further behind the poverty line. So even if their income is growing, it is rarely enough to push them over the $1.25 threshold. In 2011, the average person living in extreme poverty in Africa lived on 74 cents a day, whereas for the rest of the developing world, it was 98 cents. I’ve written before about the implications of this trend for poverty reduction in Africa here.

The third factor is that even though inequality isn’t rising in most African countries, inequality is already at unusually high levels. Where initial inequality is high, it is to be expected that economic growth delivers less poverty reduction, since the absolute increases in income associated with rising average incomes will be that much smaller for the have-nots versus the haves. Moreover, the degree of inequality that exists on the continent is worse than it looks. The fact that Africa is divided into so many countries masks big differences in income between them. If Africa were a single country, its inequality would look much worse—worse even than Latin America. Since incomes across African people vary so widely, only a fraction of people are likely to cross the poverty line at any one time. That contrasts with India where a concentration of people immediately below the $1.25 mark means that even a small increase in incomes can result in a sudden flood of people moving above the poverty line.

The above three factors explain why you would expect relatively little poverty reduction for a given amount of growth in Africa compared to elsewhere (in technical terms, a lower poverty elasticity). But they can’t explain why the number of poor people in Africa has actually increased since the start of the century. For this we need the two final factors.

The fourth factor is that there is a degree of mismatch between where growth is occurring and where the poor are on the continent. To be sure, the region’s growth acceleration has benefited some of its poorest countries, including Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Rwanda. Yet others such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Madagascar have recorded little or no growth over the past 20 years, and the number of poor people in these countries has risen accordingly. So long as a handful of the region’s fragile states struggle to build and sustain economic momentum, the number of poor people in Africa need not fall. 

The fifth and final factor concerns data quality. Poverty estimates are drawn from household surveys which in most African countries are conducted infrequently. Those that do take place often suffer from operational glitches that affect the credibility of the results. Take Nigeria, which accounts for a quarter of the people on the continent living in poverty. There are some well-documented flaws with its most recent national survey of living standards (not to be confused with the issues concerning the country’s national accounts, which were recently rebased). When new data become available, be prepared to discover that Nigeria’s poverty rate is considerably lower and has been falling at a faster pace than previously thought. As a general rule, aggregate poverty numbers for Africa should be handled with care, and small increases or decreases should not be taken too seriously.

The dissonance between Africa’s growth performance and its poverty numbers is a striking phenomenon that demands an explanation. While intuition may lead us to call into question the region’s growth—it only benefits the rich, the quality of growth is deficient, the growth numbers are exaggerated—the above five factors suggest that the answer can instead be found by analyzing Africa’s poverty data more closely.  

 

Laurence Chandy is a former fellow in the Global Economy and Development program and the Development Assistance and Governance Initiative. His research focused on poverty, fragile states, aid effectiveness, and globalization.

Read more

John Locke (1824): Two Treatises of Government (1)

John Locke (1632-1704) was an English philosopher who is considered to be one of the first philosophers of the Enlightenment and the father of classical liberalism. In his major work Two Treatises of Government Locke rejects the idea of the divine right of kings, supports the idea of natural rights (especially of property), and argues for a limited constitutional government which would protect individual rights.

Though the earth, and all inferiour creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men. For this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.

He that is nourished by the acorns he picked up under an oak, or the apples he gathered from the trees in the wood, has certainly appropriated them to himself. Nobody can deny but the nourishment is his. I ask then, when did they begin to be his? when he digested? or when he eat? or when he boiled? or when he brought them home? or when he picked them up? and it is plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labour put a distinction between them and common: that added something to them more than nature, the common mother of all, had done; and so they became his private right. And will any one say he had no right to those acorns or apples he thus appropriated, because he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? was it a robbery thus to assume to himself what belonged to all in common? If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved, notwithstanding the plenty God had given him.

We see in  commons, which remain so by compact, that it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in, which begins the property; without which the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that part does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners. Thus the grass my horse has bit; the turfs my servant has cut; and the ore I have digged in any place, where I have a right to them in common with others; become my property, without the assignation or consent of any body. The labour that was mine, removing them out of that common state they were in, hath fixed my property in them.

But the chief matter of property being now not the fruits of the earth, and the beasts that subsist on it, but the earth itself; as that which takes in, and carries with it all the rest; I think it is plain, that property in that too is acquired as the former. As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property. He by his labour does, as it were, enclose it from the common. Nor will it invalidate his right, to say every body else has an equal title to it, and therefore he cannot appropriate, he cannot enclose, without the consent of all his fellow commoners, all mankind. God, when he gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man also to labour, and the penury of his condition required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth, i. e. improve it for the benefit of life, and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour. He that, in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled, and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him.

Read more